Update - Special Report November 1992 by Loma Linda University Center for Christian Bioethics
Loma Linda University
TheScholarsRepository@LLU: Digital Archive of Research,
Scholarship & Creative Works
Update Loma Linda University Publications
11-1992
Update - Special Report November 1992
Loma Linda University Center for Christian Bioethics
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarsrepository.llu.edu/update
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Sociology Commons
This Newsletter is brought to you for free and open access by the Loma Linda University Publications at TheScholarsRepository@LLU: Digital Archive
of Research, Scholarship & Creative Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Update by an authorized administrator of
TheScholarsRepository@LLU: Digital Archive of Research, Scholarship & Creative Works. For more information, please contact
scholarsrepository@llu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Loma Linda University Center for Christian Bioethics, "Update - Special Report November 1992" (1992). Update.
http://scholarsrepository.llu.edu/update/33
LoMA LINDA UNIVERSITY 
Center for 
Christian Bioethics 
Special Report to Our Contributors 
Proposition 161-Death with Dignity Act 
Should It Become Law? 
Yes 
Michael H. White, J.D. 
Law Office of Michael H. White 
President, Americans Against Human Suffering 
The Proposed Statute 
Proposition 161 would allow voluntary physician assisted 
aid-in-dying for the terminally ill; that is, competent patients 
would be permitted to ask a willing physician to help them to 
die. 
Proposition 161 also protects physicians who render aid-
in-dying from criminal, civil and administrative liability. 
Aid-in-dying is defined as a medical procedure that will 
terminate the life of the qualified patient in a painless, 
humane and dignified manner whether administered by the 
physician at the patient's choice or direction or whether the 
physician provides means to the patient for self-administration. 
The proposed starute contains a number of safeguards, 
among which are the following: 
Only physicians are pennitted to assist terminally ill per-
sons to die; relatives, friends or others cannot assist in ending 
a life; 
Two physicians must diagnose the terminal condition; 
"Terminal condition" is defined as an illness or condition 
that will result in death within six months or less; 
The patient must be competent; 
No 
D(Jf)id C. Blake, Ph.D., J.D. 
Director, Biot'fhics Programs 
Associate Professor of Philosoplry 
Loyola Marymount University 
My opposition to Proposition 161 comes in the form of 
various consi4erations and judgments that-on balance-
weigh against legalizing voluntary active euthanasia. In fact, 
my opposition to Proposition 161 operates at different levels, 
which I hope to illustrate in the following three claims and 
their accompanying explanations. 
CLAIM #1: We should not allow ourselves the option of 
active euthanasia, at least not in this health-care context 
and social environment. 
This claim might strike many as authoritarian or pater-
nalistic. It does sound as if! am suggesting that some of us do 
not want others to enjoy a certain liberty in their own personal 
lives. A moment's reflection, however, will reveal that there 
is nothing "un-American" or inherently suspect about this 
claim. 
There are all sorts of "choices" or "options" that we do not 
allow ourselves for public policy and public morality reasons. 
For example, we do not allow ourselves the option of free, 
discretionary use of addictive drugs, even though there are 
many among us who would make good and sensible use of 
such drugs if we had this option. We do not allow ourselves the 
choice to sell ourselves into servitude or bondage to another 
(e.g., prostitution), even though for some persons such a 
choice might be acceptable if not sensible. And we do not 
allow ourselves the option NOT to provide for our futures 
Yes 
Two independent persons must witness a written request 
for aid-in-dying; 
If the patient is a resident of a nursing home, one of the 
witnesses must be a Patient Ombudsman; 
The request for aid-in-dying must be enduring one, made 
on more than one occasion; 
If the physician has doubt about the patient's mental 
competence, a psychological evaluation may be obtained with 
patient consent; 
Insurance policies are not affected; 
Notice to relatives is encouraged; 
Medical fees are limited to reasonable; 
Reporting is required, but patient confidentiality is pro-
tected. 
Opposition Challenge to Proposition 161 
The opposition to Proposition 161 is a narrow one-it is 
claimed that the initiative does not contain necessary safe-
guards, that it is fatally flawed and defective. The opposition 
~.es further that this issue is not a moral one, that it is poor 
.ftsmanship. On both grounds the opposition campaign is 
in error. 
Daniel Callahan said in the Hastings Center Report of 
MarchlAprill992 the following: 
I see no way, even in principle, to write or enforce a 
meaningful law that can guarantee effective procedural 
safeguards. The reason is obvious yet almost always 
overlooked. The euthanasia transaction will ordinarily 
take place within the boundaries of the private and con-
fidential doctor-patient relationship. No one can possibly 
know what takes place in that context unless the doctor 
chooses to reveal it. 
In short, there is no possible way to write a statute with 
sufficient safeguards unless such safeguards would insure that 
no patient could have the assistance of a physician in dying. 
This issue is confirmed in many of the recent debates on this 
issue by spokespersons for the opposition campaign-they 
simply cannot accede to the concept of helping a person to die. 
The issue is truly a moral one, and that is the debate which 
should be occurring, rather than whether or not the statute is 
drafted sufficiently clearly, as it is. 
When courts declared therightofpatients to refuse medical 
ne, to permit, over the protest of the medical establishment, 
shutting off of respirators, the withdrawal or withholding 
or food and hydration, no safeguards were declared. No 
statutes have been passed to establish safeguards for the 
turning off of respirators or withdrawal of food and hydration. 
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(e.g., forced Social Security contributions), even though some 
among us would make good use of such an option. The mere 
fact that some persons might make good use of some choice 
does not in itself decide the issue of what liberties or rights we 
should allow in our society. 
Moreover, Proposition 161 is not a privacy issue. Decrimi-
nalizing suicide might be a privacy issue, but this is not what 
Proposition 161 is about. It is about what we will allow 
regarding a public institution: heal th care. Public institutions 
should be governed by public policy and public morality. 
I can think of at least three reasons that would counsel 
against a right to voluntary active euthanasia, even though I 
admit that some people might make good use of such a right. 
First, it is a dangerous right-{)ne that lends itself to serious 
abuse-in the context of a health-care culture that poorly 
manages pain and that tends to overtreat patients because of 
an ad hoc approach to patient care (treating symptoms or 
complications as they arise with little thought to the overall 
treatment goals for this patient). Moreover, it is a dangerous 
right in a racially and ethnically divided society in which 
millions are without adequate access to health care. These 
conditions in health care and society put great pressure on 
individuals to make all the wrong assessments about the 
quality of their lives and their worth as individuals. If you 
introduce into this context a right to voluntary active eutha-
nasia, then you introduce an irreversible way for people to act 
out these wrong assessments. 
Second, there is the danger of a slippery slope between a 
very limited right to active euthanasia and its abuse in cases 
where patients are terminated on the initiative of others. The 
logic operating here would be the following. If a competent, 
terminally ill patient is allowed the right to voluntary active 
euthanasia, it is because we consider it reasonable for some-
one in this situation to want this "service." But if it is 
reasonable for the competent patient, why not the incompe-
tent patient? And if it is reasonable for the terminally ill 
patient, why not the chronically ill patient in an equally 
painful condition? Would not all the reasons offered in 
support of Proposition 161 apply equally well to these other 
categories of patients? 
Third, I think that voluntary active euthanasia is wrong in 
itself, because it violates the fact that we as individuals have 
only a stewardship and not an absolute ownership over our 
own lives. This is not an appeal to some sectarian religious 
notion. The idea of stewardshi p is central to most, if not all, 
Christian moral traditions. It is also central to most, if not all, 
Jewish moral traditions and Islamic moral traditions. Itis even 
central to John Locke's argument for natural rights and lim-
ited government! In other words, the stewardship oflife is a 
defining idea of our religious and political traditions, and 
should not be ignored in determining the public propriety of 
Proposition 161. 
CLAIM #2: Even it we were to agree to give ourselves 
the option of voluntary active euthanasia, Proposition 
161 is the wrong way to legalize this practice. 
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Rather, guidelines have developed along with the case law 
d statutory law, and such guidelines are the rules by which 
.e medical community renders services. 
Opponents examine Proposition 161 as if no other rules 
exist to guide society or medical practice. Rather, the statute 
is dissected in a vacuum, and if it cannot stand on its own, in 
the opposition view, it is defective, fatally flawed. 
A recent critic, a physician said that he examined patient 
files in"preparing for the debate of this issue and found that in 
each of six cases where life suppon systems were turned off to 
permit patients to die, there were at least three consultations 
reflected in the medical records of each patient. And he 
pointed out that nothing in Proposition 161 required consul-
tation, nor the use of qualified medical specialists, nor did it 
require the involvement of family members in the dying 
process, etc., etc., etc. 
My response was simple. Where is the statute which 
requires the consultations, the specialists, the family, and the 
other issues he raised regarding the ueatment of patients in 
his facility, whether such patients are dying or having a simple 
appendectomy? I got a blank stare, because there are none. 
There is only the ever growing, ever changing body of good 
medical practice which goes on, and will go on with Proposition 
161 as law. 
Nothing in the statute prohibits specialists to be involved, 
for consultation to be obtained, for family to be involved, for 
~. tnesses to be present at the time of death. Because a 
ldical procedure is at the heart of the statute, informed 
consent of the patient will be required in every case. Insti-
tutions will determine the appropriate guidelines, protocols, 
rules of practice that should guide good medical practice in 
dealing with the dying process, which will include assisting 
those who are dying. 
Impact 
For those physicians who are ethically, morally or religiously 
opposed to aid-in-dying, there will be no impact on their 
medical practice, as they will not participate in the process. 
For those physicians who will participate, it wil1 permit 
them to determine with their patients the time and manner of 
death, should the physician be unable to relieve the pain and 
suffering which terminally ill patients fear. It will not be 
necessary for the physician to choose between abandoning a 
patient by saying there is no more that he or she can do, or 
breaking the law. 
The practice of assisting person to die which presently 
occurs in violation oflaw, in secret, without documentation, 
conuol or regulation, will with Proposition 161 be broughtinto 
the open, permitting the treattnent of dying patients in a 
caring way with full documentation, participation of family 
and friends as the patient may choose, and with the support of 
~essary and appropriate medical staff. 
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This claim involves two points. The first is that a ballot 
initiative is a clumsy way to enact a law of such far-reaching 
implications. The ballot initiative process does not allow for 
or encourage the kind of reflective deliberation available in 
the processes of legislative enactments. How many people 
really understood Proposition 161 and its implications before 
signing the petition getting it on the ballot? And how many 
people wil1 educate themselves on the issues and problems of 
Proposition 161 before voting for or against it? Yet if passed, 
Proposition 161 could be altered or changed only upon a 2/3 
vote of the California Legislature. 
The second objection contained in this claim has to do 
with the issue of adequate safeguards, and whether Proposi-
tion 161 contains sufficient safeguards to minimize possible 
abuses in the practice of active euthanasia. Since this issue of 
safeguards is the one usually debated and may be most 
familiar to the reader, I will focus on only two problem areas. 
There is no requirement that the active euthanasia be ad-
ministered solely or even principally for the elimination of 
pain and suffering. Thus, a clinically depressed patient who 
is not in pain could be assisted in his or her suicide, even 
though the motivating force for the suicide is clinical de-
pression. Second, any physician can certify terminal illness 
and perform active euthanasia, regardless of that physician's 
lack of uaining or expertise in the illness or lack of extended, 
meaningful relationship with the patient. Along with other 
safeguard problems, these two suggest that Proposition 161 
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Defining a New Area of Approved Behavior of 
Physicians 
'We do not help the argument or advance understanding by 
saying that the Initiative provides for assisted suicide or 
euthanasia. It does both, but in a qualified way: it relates 
solely to the competent, terminally ill patient. 
The question is whether we believe that what is perrni tted 
by the Initiative is conduct which we wish to condone. That 
conduct is voluntary physician assisted aid-in-dying for the 
terminally i1l, as I have defined it: to administer a medical 
procedure which is painless, human and dignified or provide 
the means for patient self-administration to end a life. The 
question is not if what the Initiative would permit is suicide or 
euthanasia; it is, should such behavior be permissible, lawful 
behavior. 
The real issues that motivate interest in aid-in-dying are 
the patient's desire to maintain control during the dying 
process, the fear of pain and the fear of prolonged suffering 
and indignity. As physicians gain more confidence in the use 
of pain-relieving drugs for the terminally ill and the public 
perceives a willingness to use such measure, terminally ill 
person will have less actual need for aid-in-dying. However, 
there will be some, at least under present technology, whose 
suffering will not be relieved, and Proposition 161 will permit 
a physician to lawfully help such a patient to die. 
r:tclusion· 
Voluntary physician assisted aid-in-dying for the terminally 
ill is not mutually exclusive of adequate pain management 
and control nor more and better hospice care. I believe it is 
complementary, and the passage of Proposition 161 will en-
courage physicians to do better in pain management and to 
make better use of hospice alternatives. 
The moral issue is not whether or not it is moral to take 
affirmative steps to end a life, even if the patientrequests such 
hel p and is dying with pain and suffering. The moral issue, in 
my view, has become whether or not it is immoral to withhold 
from dying, suffering patients who request help in dying the 
technology which will end life painlessly, humanely and wi~~ 
dignity. 
I have come to the conclusion thata compassionate society 
will provide the benefits of its technology to end suffering for 
those competent, terminally ill persons who request such 
help, and that Proposition 161 in providing aid-in-dying for 
the competent, terminally ill person is a step toward a more 
compassionate society. 0 
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could turn California into a suicide haven for clinically de-
pressed patients and for unscrupulous physicians eager to 
resurrect their failing practices. 
CLAIM #3: Even if Proposition 161 were to pass on 
November 3, it would be wrong for health-care profes-
sions to embrace the "ethic" implied in this measure as 
their professional ethic. 
If Proposition 161 does pass on November 3 it may be 
because it is based upon the "legal ethic" that dominates our 
attitudes if not conduct towards one another. This is the 
"ethic" of maximum forbearance and maximum autonomy. It 
is the idea that as fellow citizens of this civil society we are 
obliged to give to one another the greatest leeway possible and 
thereby insure that each of us as individuals is granted as much 
autonomy as possible. Given the origins of our political 
culture and the current composition of this society, this ethic 
might make perfect sense, but not necessarily in every con-
text. This legal ethic is, after all, an ethic of strangers, and it 
is not every context in which we should relate to one another 
as strangers. 
Health care is not civil society. Accordingly, an ethic that 
might make sense in the context of the relations of civil 
society would not make sense in the context of the relations 
of health care: the physician and patient are not simply 
"fellow citizens" and thereby should not be strangers. 
This means that while the physicians as fellow citizens 
might have to recognize and forebear the patient's legal right 
to voluntary active euthanasia, the physicain as health-care 
professional must resist this practice for the good of the 
profession. 
Proposition 161 asserts that performing voluntary active 
euthanasia "shall [not] be ... unprofessional conduct" (Sec. 
2525.9). This assumes, of course, that the law can dictate by 
caveat what is or is not professional conduct in the healthcare 
professions. I prefer to believe that the inherent ethical 
integrity of health care derives from its nature, and that this 
nature dictates the pursuit of three equally important and 
compelling goods: sustaining life, eliminating suffering, and 
restoring physicial autonomy (meaning that the patient be-
comes as little dependent as possible on medical assistance 
itself). When anyone of these goods is pursued in a way that 
excludes or ignores the others, then health care loses its 
ethical integrity-not withstanding pronouncements in case 
law or statutes or ballot initiates. This is, I believe, precisely 
what would happen ifheal theare professionals began to practice 
volunraryactiveeuthanasia under the authority of Proposition 
161. 0 
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